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Opportunities and Chal enges in M1ne 
Action in Afghanistan, 2002-2003 
The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan 
(MAPA) was established under the auspices of the United 
Nations following the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the 
country in 1989. Originally tasked with helping the Afghans 
rid themselves of the land mines that the Red Army had laid, the 
Programme has evolved over time ro deal with the mine and 
UXO contamination caused by the successor conflicts to the 
1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war. This includes the period of the 
pro-Soviet ruling government (1989-1992), during figh ting 
between various factions from 1992-1995, during the Taliban 
era, in fighting with resistance forces from 1996 to September 
2001, and finally , during military operations by and against the 
American-led Coalition in October- November 2001 and 
beyond. At present, Afghanistan has over 872 sq km of suspect-
ed mined land and an additional450 sq km ofland thought to 
be contaminated by UXO, making it one of the most mine-
and UXO-affected countries in the world. Up to five people a 
day are killed or injured by mines and UXO; nearly 25 years 
after their original deployment. 
Each successive conflict has resulted in a changed 
operational environment for the MAPA. The October-
November 200 I war that led to the ousting of the Tali ban 
regime is no exception . However, unlike most of the conflicts, 
which simply increased che amount of contaminated land fac-
ing MAPA clearance and risk education reams, many of che 
changes associated with the emergence of an internationally 
recognized Afghan government led by President Hamid Karzai 
have had a positive impact on mine action. 
ecogmsed 
The post-Taliban Afghanistan that emerged from the 
December 200 I Bonn negotiations following the Coalition 
military intervention featured an inrernationally recognized 
central government char indicated that it was ready to join 
inrernational treaties, including the Orrawa Convenrion. 
Afghanistan has indeed joined the Ottawa Convention, becom-
ing a State Parry o n I March 2003. In a tense region, 
Afghanistan's decision ro unilaterally give up chis weapon 
should be applauded; a number of Afghanistan's neighbors are 
nor Parries to the Conven tion, including Pakistan, Iran, China 
and Uzbekistan. 
That Afghanistan has taken chis courageous step has 
provided rhe MAPA with the opportun ity ro plan its work 
by Patrick Fruchet, External Relations Officer, UNMACA 
around Convention timelines; a I 0-year plan 
ro make Afghanistan mine-effect free was 
endorsed by the government in March 2003. 
Costing models for the I 0-year plan have been 
developed. We estimate that the total cost fo r 
making Afghanistan mine-effect free is in rhe 
order of $500 million (U.S.). 
This regime change has also provid-
ed the United Nations with a host govern-
ment chat is eager to cake over the manage-
menr responsibility for mine action as soon as 
is practically possible. To this end, the Afghan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs-the lead ministry 
fo r mine action within the government-led 
consultative group process-has been chairing 
meetings to plan the transition of the MAPA 
from United Nations to national administra-
tion. Representatives from other Afghan gov-
ernment min istries, mine action donors, rhe 
United Nations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) working in mine 
action in Afghanistan have been active partic-
ipants in these discussions. 
H owever, rhe change in govern-
ment has not been witho ut irs challenges, par-
ticularly with regards to security. The post-
Taliban government is one that bas had diffi-
cultly projecting power beyond the capital, 
Kabul; indeed, even with in the capital, this 
£1ctionalised government has been, co a large 
extent, protected by a mixture of Coalition 
fo rces and their Northern Alliance allies, and 
also by rbc UN-sanctioned I nternarional 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In the 
regions, factional commanders, whom some 
consider "warlords," quickly filled the security 
vacuum left by the defeat of the Taliban. The 
security enviro nment within which the 
Programme now operates has had a detrimen-
tal effecr on clearance and risk education 
activities. In the absence of clearly demarcated 
front-line areas in the ongoing low-intensity 
cooAicr in Afghanistan-a conflict char bas 
claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and 
dozens of Afghan and international aid work-
ers since December 200 1-rhe Programme 
has been forced to make extensive usc of 
armed guards for rhe fi rst time in irs hisrmy. 
The MAPA has recorded over 50 security inci-
dents against demining reams in the lasr rwo 
years, culminating in rhe murder of four 
Afghan deminers in Febru:uy 2004. These 
four, employees of the Organisation for Mine 
Clearance and Afghan Rehabili tation, were 
traveling wirhour guards in a part of the coun-
try considered to be safe when they were 
ambushed and shot to death. No arrests have 
been made in rhis case. Afghan aurhorities 
have suggested char the perpetrators of this 
crime could be clements loyal to the former 
Tali ban regime. 
oney, Diverse 
The fall of the Taliban has resulted 
m a large financial boost for the MAPA. 
Whereas in 2000 and 2001 rhe United 
Nations and rhe MAPA agencies were nor able 
ro raise all the money to fund a $20 million 
p rogramme that employed 4,500 Afghan 
deminers and risk education workers, the 17 
MAPA implementing agencies now employ 
almost 8,000 people. The budget has jumped 
to $60 million per year and th is budget was 
fully funded in 2003. Early indications are 
char donors will continue ro provide th is level 
of support in 2004. T his boost is largely due 
ro the focus on reconstruction and peace-
building in posr-Taliban Afghanisran. T he 
MAPA's traditional work in humanitarian 
mine clearance and risk education has also 
increased alongside these new requirements. 
However, bringing in $60 mill ion a 
year has come at a cost; with the increase in 
money has come an increase in the complexi-
ty of the Programme, with the United 
Nations and the MAPA implementing part-
ners having to deal with a myriad of different 
funding modalities. 
In Afghanistan, absent a regional or 
national mine action trust fund, the New 
York-based United Nations Voluntary Trust 
Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) 
remains rhe largest single conduit for donor 
support. However, other donors provide 
grants to national and international NGOs 
operating in Afghanistan or sign service con-
tracts directly with these NGOs or via other 
UN entities. In some cases, the donor in ques-
tion is an Afghan government ministry, which 
has itself received inrernational funding sup-
port. For example, the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation has contracted MAPA implementing 
partners for rhc clearance of Kabul 
International Airporr. 
The increased mine action funding 
char is a result of regime change in Afghan-
istan can be considered ro fall inro three major 
categories: humanitarian funding, reconstruc-
tion funding and peace-building funding. 
Humanitarian funding is provided 
for the coordination and execution of mine 
and UXO clearance, victim assistance, and 
advocacy and risk awareness activities that are 
focused on responding ro prioritized commu-
nity needs, based on the current impact (both 
physical impact, in terms of deaths and 
injuries, and economic impact, in terms of 
access to agricultural lands and ocher produc-
tive assets.) Humanitarian mine action, 
whether it be clearance or risk education, 
yields immediate positive impacts. This is 
based on the prioritization of contamination 
inflicting casualties and impeding the fulfil-
menr of basic human rights, including the 
right of return for refugees (demining returnee 
villages), ro a livelihood and food security 
(providing access ro agricultural and grazing 
land), ro education (demining schools and 
paths ro schools), and ro healthcare (demining 
hcalrh clinics and paths to health clinics) . The 
MAPA's prioritization system is currently 
being enhanced through the rollout of a 
Retrofit Landmine Impact Survey (LIS). The 
LIS is designed ro idemifY those communities 
in most critical need of humanitarian mine 
action-mine clearance, mine risk education, 
victim assistance, dangerous area marking or 
rhe desrrucrion of UXO. This is achieved 
through a questionnaire process that grades 
(or scores) the impact of mines and UXO on 
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communities. A significam end-product of the 
process is rhe ability ro identify rhe high-, 
medium- and low-impact communities. 
These scores can then be used as markers 
against progress. The Afghan survey includes a 
reuofir component so that the data collected 
over the past 14 years can be incorporated into 
the LIS's impact grading system. 
ec 
Reconstruction funding is provided 
for the coordination and execution of mine 
and UXO clearance activities that are a precur-
sor to major infrastructure projects such as 
road construction, power line repairs and irri-
gation system rehabilitation. This rype of 
funding, whether provided through a grant or 
a service contract, rends ro come from the same 
donor rhar is funding rhe infrastructure proj-
ect. T his allows rhe donors and their collabora-
tors amongst Ministries and implememing 
partners to rrear the demining reams as parr of 
their overall available assets. This provides for 
maximum flexibility as the same donor con-
trols the fund allocations for both rhe demi-
ning conrracror and other construction con-
tractors, and can thus line manage all of the 
contractors whose work is necessaty for the 
completion of rhe reconstruction project. 
e a 
Peace-building funding is provided 
fo r the coordination and execution of the 
Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) initiative and 
rhe destruction of anti-personnel mine stock-
piles. 
MAFP is a reintegration project 
designed to assist former fighters demobilized 
through an Mghanisran-wide demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration process to fir 
into civil life again. Former fighters are trained 
in manual clearance, permanent marking, and 
mine risk education techniques and are given 
employment for 13 monrhs. While parr of 
each day is spent in mine action operations, 
rhe orher parr is spent in literacy and vocation-
al training. The aim of the project is to devel-
op a viable reintegration strategy for each for-
mer fighter. 
This project is a full spectrum 
demobilisation option. lr addresses rhe eco-
nomic needs of demobilized fighters bur also 
deals wirh problems of psychological adjust-
ment and community acceptance. Ir also has 
the potential of expanding MAPA's mine and 
UXO clearance rates. The current project plan 
is to open places for 8,000 soldiers over a 
three-year period. In addition ro providing a 
first-class reintegration option for the former 
fighters involved, this project will add a total 
of 8,000 man-years of demining ro rhe 
Programme. 
Given rhar Afghanistan became a 
Srare Parry to the Ottawa Convention on 1 
March 2003, the country must destroy all 
stockpiles of ami-personnel mines on irs terri-
tory within four years. Despite rhe destruction 
of over 5,000 stockpiled anti-personnel mines 
since the tteaty cmered into force, there is still 
a srrong need ro identify and destroy rhe large 
quantities of ami-personnel mines stockpiled 
around the counuy. As a result, the Ministry of 
Defence, with support from the North 
Arlamic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led 
ISAF and rhe MAPA, has developed a Strategic 
Plan for rhe National Destruction of Ami-
Personnel Mines, which is based on lessons 
learned from a successful srockpile destruction 
pilot project carried out in Kabul in 2003 and 
early 2004. The stockpile destruction project 
aims to survey, assess, collect and destroy ami-
personnel srockpiles around rhe counrry, 
develop national regulations on the trans-
portation, storage and desrrucrion of ami-per-
sonnel mines, and to conduct a public infor-
mation campaign on the significance and 
scope of rhe stockpile destruction initiative. 
The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
(NAMSA), which is NATO's principal logistic 
support management agency, will also be prov-
ing project management staff ro assist the 
Ministry of Defence. 
In order to mobilize resources 
through the humanitarian, reconstruction and 
peace-building channels, rhe United Nations 
and the MAPA NGOs have had to accept a 
myriad of different funding modalities along-
side the traditional grants-based approach of 
the VTF. This has taxed rhe NGOs' ability ro 
administer rhe grants and contracts manage-
ment side of rheir operations. The United 
Nations has also been forced to increase and 
diversify its skills base. The United Nations 
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan 
(UNMACA), working out of eight major cities 
in Mghanisran, now employs over 150 people, 
including 17 expatriates, to coordinate the 
increasingly complex MAPA and to manage 
host government and donor relations. Five of 
these expatriates, (including lawyers, fund-rais-
ers and finance sraff) work full rime and anoth-
er three senior managers dedicate parr of their 
rime ro raise money or help rhe NGOs admin-
ister and report on the money rhar has been 
raised, with the rest of rhe expatriate rime spent 
coordinating rhe NGOs' field operations or in 
support functions. To lessen the reliance on 
expatriates and ro smooth rhe way for the 
evenrual transition to national administration, 
rhe UNMACA has also beefed up rhe training 
capacity within the Programme and has inrro-
duced dedicated training courses for rhe 
NGOs 111 financial adminisrrarion and 
accounting. 
Despite the challenges, the emer-
gence of a post-Taliban Mghan governmenr 
has had a positive impact on mine action in rhe 
country, both in terms of being able ro plan 
with a recognized government that is a State 
Parry to rhe Ottawa Convention and also in 
being able to work with that government ro 
raise rhe resources necessaty ro pay for rhe plan. 
The next challenge is to create the opportunity 
to transition a programme rhar has been 
administered by the United Nations for rhe 
past 14 years to a national authority rhar has the 
capacity to continue ro manage this complex 
Programme in rhe years ahead. A thorough and 
derailed transition plan that sets out the criteria 
and milestones for a successful transition 
should be released in the coming months. 
Contact Information: 
Patrick F rucher 
UNMACA External Relations Officer 
P.O. Box No. 520 
Kabul, Afghanistan 
Tel: +870 762 918 170 
Fax: +870 762 918 171 
E-mail: parriek@unmaca.org 
The 
OTTHWH COUUEUTIOU 
in Perspective 
Seldom has a name caused such 
polarity among like-minded people, in this 
case those concerned with mine action. The 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APM-
BC) of 1997, commonly called the "Mine Ban 
Treaty," or more often the "Orrawa Treary," is 
loved by some- loathed by ochers. To some ir 
is rhe lynchpin of mine action activities, ro 
others ir is a disrracter from pragmatic mine 
action challenges. Some will nor take action 
against mines without "it" being invoked, oth-
ers will nor rake action if "ir" is invoked. 
As an American involved in rhe 
mine action community, being a citizen of a 
major non-signatory to the convention, I 
often fed rhe scorn of Orrawa boosters. 
Usually this comes in rhe form of icy silence (I 
am often given the role of rhe Invisible Man at 
APMBC-relared gatherings), and sometimes 
via obstructionism. Bur as rhc director of a 
global outreach cemer, I also observe the dis-
dain of "Ottawa" doubters who seem to have 
little time for reflection on rhe benefits of rhe 
convention. 
As we approach rhe review of rhe 
APMBC, I think iris rime to rake a forthright 
look ar it and have the courage and good sense 
ro accept ir for what it is and does-and what 
it is not and does nor do. 
The Stlqma of Landmine Use 
The "Mine Ban Treaty" has cer-
tainly chilled the production, use and transfer 
of landmines. The public's knowledge about 
rhe latent landmine threat has, ro some 
degree, been engaged by Princess Diana and 
the APMBC. Bur even among policy makers 
and rhe international community, there is no 
doubt that rhe issue of anti-personnel land-
mines has come ro rhe fore largely because of 
rhe dialog, meetings, discussions, and provi-
sions of the convention and that the doctrinal 
and conventional use of landmines has been 
dramatically reduced because of the stigma 
attached to them. This is no small fear and 
provides a global mindser within which mine 
action can now effectively rake place. 
tockplle Destruction 
Another clear benefit of rhc 
APMBC is rhar it has provided a finite, 
acceptable and measurable way to destroy 
stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. We 
need nor assume rhat all landmines rhar have 
been rhus destroyed were viable or that all 
landmine stocks have been accurately 
accounted for. T he salient fact is rhat massive 
numbers oflandmines have been systematical-
ly destroyed and thar national programs 
brought into being for this purpose have been 
not only successful, bur have facilitated the 
coordination of complementary humanitarian 
efforts within some countries. Indeed the use 
of some military organizations to carry our rhe 
destruction of landmine stockpiles has 
enhanced their role in humanitarian efforts. 
Communication, Coordination and 
Consensus 
A third effect of rhe APMBC is that 
ir has focused much arrention and facilitated 
much action on the activities and functions of 
what we have come to call "mine action." 
Without the meetings of rhe lnrersessional 
Workgroups, steering committees, the sub-
mission of reports and presentations, many 
governments, non governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) , donors, and the United 
Nations would not have been able to define 
and propose action plans ro address rhe wide 
scope of mine action challenges. The pure acr 
of having real-rime discussions among groups 
rhar might ordinarily never see one another, 
much less engage in dialog, has lead to new 
partnerships, new approaches to mine action 
activities, and if nor always a clear consensus, 
rhen ar least a greater understanding of rhe 
p roblem and an awareness of others engaged 
in the effort. The fact rhar national govern-
mental agencies of countries at risk are rou-
tinely coordinating wirh NGOs, visiting mili-
taries, rhe United Nations, regional organiza-
tions and donor countries is truly amazing. 
The meetings of rhe various venues of the 
APMBC provide a good sounding board in 
which ideas compere for arrention and gener-
al approval. 
estrlction of HPLs by the 
.onuention on Conventional 
JJeapons 
On the other hand, rhe APMBC is 
nor rhe only international instrument to 
restrict rhe use of anti-personnel landmines, 
but for some reason, many "Mine Ban Treaty" 
advocates often fail to add rhe aurhoriry of 
Protocol II of rhe Convention on Conven-
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